National Law School of India Review
Volume 21

Issue 1

Article 2

2009

Of Maternal State and Minimalist Judiciary: The Indian Supreme
Court's Approach to Terror-Related Adjudication
Mrinal Satish
Aparna Chandra

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsir

Recommended Citation
Satish, Mrinal and Chandra, Aparna (2009) "Of Maternal State and Minimalist Judiciary: The Indian
Supreme Court's Approach to Terror-Related Adjudication," National Law School of India Review: Vol. 21:
Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsir/vol21/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in National Law School of India Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact library@nls.ac.in.

NLSI
SPECIAL ISSUE

OF MATERNAL STATE AND MINIMALIST
JUDICIARY: THE INDIAN SUPREME
COURT'S APPROACH TO TERRORRELATED ADJUDICATION
-Mrinal Satish* and Aparna Chandra**

I. INTRODUCTION
What is the role of a constitutional court in a democracy? This
fundamental question of constitutional theory has consumed many forests
but continues to haunt theorists and practitioners of constitutional law
alike., The question has deep implications for day-to-day decision-making
by constitutional courts, not only in ascertaining the scope of the court's
power of constitutional adjudication and review,2 but also in determining
judicial methodology, and also the substantive outcomes of Constitutional
Associate Professor, National Law University, Delhi.
Assistant Professor, National Law University, Delhi. This article first appeared as 21(1)
NAT. L. SCH. INDIA REV. 51 (2009).

See, Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court 2001 Term, Foreword: Judge on Judging: The
Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 13 (2002-2003). See also, Frank
Paddock, American Democracy and the Supreme Court, 14 TEMP. L. Q. 210 (1939-40); R.

B. Stevens, The Role of a Final Appeal Court in a Democracy: The House of Lords Today,
28 MOD. L. REV. 509 (1965); Michael Allen Berch, An Essay on the Role of the Supreme
Court in the Adjudication of Constitutional Rights, 1984 ARIz. ST. L. J. 283 (1984); Pius

N. Langa, The Role of the Constitutional Court in the Enforcement and the Protection of
Human Rights in South Africa, 41 ST. Louis U. L. J. 1259 (1996-1997); Jeremy Sarkin, The
Political Role of the South African Constitutional Court, 114 S. AFRICAN L. J. 134 (1997),
Jutta L imbach, The Role of the Federal Constitutional Court, 53 S. M. U. L. REV. 429
(2ooo); Aharon Barak, The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy and the FightAgainst
Terrorism, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 125 (2003-2004).
2

See,

ALEXANDER

PoLITICS (1986).

M.

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
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adjudication.3 These issues form the crux of this article. We seek to explore
the contours of one such approach - the minimalist approach to decisionmaking - with particular reference to the Indian Supreme Court's usage
of this approach in constitutional adjudication of terror-related cases. We
argue that the Supreme Court has been using minimalist strategies in
dealing with such cases, and that the use of this approach is opportunistic
and escapist rather than either the expression of a well-theorized
understanding of the role of courts in the Indian polity, or a reflection of
broader policy rationales for adopting such a strategy.
Part II of the paper will briefly outline the theory of minimalism as
an approach to decision-making and will discuss the rationale for the
approach as well as the facets of a minimalist strategy of decision-making.
Part III will then examine how the Supreme Court's decisions on terrorrelated Constitutional law cases reflect the use of a minimalist strategy.
Part IV will test this against the methodology of the Supreme Court in
Constitutional adjudication in general, and will highlight the difference
between the methodologies adopted in general Constitutional adjudication
and terror-related adjudication. Part V, the concluding section, will make
more general claims on the disparity in methodology in terror and nonterror-related constitutional adjudication by the Supreme Court.
Before we begin, we would like to clarify that in this article we do not
make a normative claim about whether or not a minimalist strategy is
justified (though in our reading of the role of courts in the Indian polity,
we believe that it is not). The larger point we are making is that regardless
of whether minimalism is justified, the usage of this strategy by Indian
Courts is neither consistent across the genre of constitutional adjudication,
nor is it informed by a clear understanding of the role of courts in a
constitutional democracy.
II.

MINIMALISM DEFINED

Minimalism is a methodology for judicial decision-making4 that
essentially advocates that judicial decisions should be made on the
3 See, Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
L. REV. 1 (1979).

HARV.

Benjamin C. Zipursky, Minimalism, Perfectionism, and Common Law Constitutionalism:
Reflections on Sunstein's and Fleming's Efforts to Find the Sweet Spot in Constitutional
4

Theory, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2997, 3002 (2oo6-2007).
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narrowest possible grounds sufficient to decide the dispute before
the court, while leaving larger questions of principle for decision by
the political branches, or deferring to their stance on such principles.
Minimalism therefore deals with the issue of how the court should go
about the decision-making exercise, and touches on both the approach of
courts in constitutional adjudication, as well as the substantive outcome of
such decisions.
Minimalism has had a long history in American constitutional
scholarship, though the express use of the term has been recently
popularized by Cass Sunstein. As far back as 1936, Justice Brandies stated
in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority that "[t]he Court will not pass
upon a constitutional question although properlypresented by the record,
if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of." Writing in the 196os, and examining the activism of the
Warren Court, Alexander Bickel propounded the idea of "passive virtues"a list of tools to postpone or avoid resolving disputes.6 While Bickel's
focus was on when courts should and should not review decisions of the
political branches, Cass Sunstein coined the phrase judicial minimalism to
denote an approach that "increase[s] the scope for continuing democratic
deliberation on the problem at hand" even in cases where the courts
do decide to exercise review.: Therefore while Bickel focuses on when
to review cases, Sunstein focuses on how to do so." In recent times,
minimalism has found proponents on the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor is generally classified as a minimalist.9 More
recently still, Chief Justice John Roberts famously remarked, "[i]f it is
not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case ... it is necessary not
to decide more."o Minimalism has also recently been gaining currency
in American legal scholarship, both in response to the ideas put forward
I Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US 288, 347 (1936).
6 See, Bickel, supra note 3, at 111-198. See also, Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court
1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1967).
7 CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
ONE CASE AT A TIME, 39-40 (1999); Jonathan T. Molot, Principled

Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between JudicialMinimalism and Neutral Principles,
90 VA.

L.

REV. 1753,

1778

(2004).

* Neil S. Seigel, A Theory in Search of a Court and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the
Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1958 (2004-2005).
9 See, Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899 (2005-20o6)
(discussing Justice O'Connor's preference for minimalist rulings, and arguing that "[f]or the
last generation, Justice O'Connor has been the [U.S. Supreme] Court's leading minimalist").

1oCass R. Sunstein, The Minimalist, L. A. Times, May 25, 2006 at B11, available at http://
www.law.uchicago.edu/sunstein-minimalism-roberts.html.
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in Cass Sunstein's writings on the issue, and as a liberal response to the
perceived conservative bent of the current Supreme Court.
In Cass Sunstein's conceptualization of minimalism, there are two
facets to the strategy - narrowness and shallowness. 12 Narrowness refers
to the approach of deciding cases on as narrow grounds as possible, so
that the decision applies to as few cases that might arise in the future; and
shallowness refers to avoidance of linking the reasoning to debates about
more fundamental values.13 The effort is to settle pending disputes rather
than articulate deeper constitutional principles.14 The focus of all scholarly
writing in the minimalist tradition is to "postpone resolution of deeper
debates",'15 so that political branches can engage with the issue, instead of
judicial decisions occupying the field. The distinction between narrow and
shallow decisions has also been referred to as procedural and substantive
minimalism: procedural where the dispute is fully decided but on as
narrow grounds as possible, so that its impact on future cases is as limited
as possible; and substantive where the decision-making is either avoided,
or substantial deference is afforded to the political branches. 6 Narrowness
or procedural minimalism is therefore about the scope of the court's
decision; and shallowness or substantive minimalism is about its content.17
To give an example of how a minimalist approach would work, let us
examine the case of Anuj Garg v. Hotel Assn. of India.," The issue in this
case was whether Section 30, Punjab Excise Act of 1914, which prohibited

the employment of all women and of men under the age of twenty-five,
in establishments serving liquor, was violative of Article 14 and Article
15 (1) of the Constitution of India. The argument of the State was that
the provision was protected under Article 15(3) of the Constitution
as it made special provisions for women. The narrow question before
the Court was whether security concerns could justify the protection
of Article 15(3) for the said provision. The Court however decided on
1 See, Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1454, 1456 (2000).
12 SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 10.
13 Neil S. Seigel, A Theory in Search of a Court and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the
Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1958 (2004-2005), at 1955.
14 Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETELED CONSTITUTION: A NEw DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 31-32 (2001).
65 Molot, supra note 8, at 1781.
6

See, Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New JudicialMinimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV.

1454, 1456 (2000), at 1459.
17Id, at 1460.
is Anuj Garg v. Hotel Assn. of India, (2oo8) 3 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India).
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two broader issues (i) what types of concerns are justified in limiting
the exercise of Fundamental Rights (and held that in the hierarchy of
norms, Fundamental Rights are of greater salience than social goals like
providing security, which cannot be balanced against the former); and (2)
the nature of review in cases that fall under Article 15(1) (holding that
"strict scrutiny" applies to such cases). Had the case been decided on
the narrow issue, it would have formed precedent for future cases that
looked at the scope of Article 15(3). In deciding on the broader issues,
the case now forms precedent not only for all equality review cases, but
also for all cases in which rights are sought to be balanced against other
social interests. The non-minimalism of the case along the shallowness
continuum is also evident from the fact that the Court linked its decision
to the deeply jurisprudential debate over the scope of Fundamental Rights
vis-A-vis other social interests - a debate that has raged for centuries in
jurisprudential scholarship without a clear winner.19
A. Justifications for Minimalism
It is important to clarify that minimalism straddles both the normative
and the descriptive realms. It is both a prescriptive theory as well as a
description of judicial practice. As a normative theory, minimalism seeks
to promote the values of certainty, consistency, adherence to legal rules,
and promotion of democratic deliberations in adjudication.20 It is broadly
a response to concerns over the democratic legitimacy of judicial review;
and realist concerns over the articulation of personal preferences rather
than legal principles in judicial adjudication. These and other concerns are
identified in this segment.
19See, Francois Du Bois, Rights T-umped? Balancing in Constitutional Adjudication, ACTA
JURIDICA 155 (2004); T. M. Scanlon, Adjusting Rights and Balancing Values, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1478 (2003-2004); Denise Meyerson, Why Courts Should Not Balance Rights Against

the Public Interest, 31 MELB. U. L. REV. 873 (2007); Cristopher Supino, The Police Power
and "Public Use": Balancing the Public Interest Against Private Rights Through Principled
ConstitutionalDistinctions, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 712 (2007-2008); Donald L. Beschle, Kant's
CategoricalImperative: An Unspoken Factor in ConstitutionalRights Balancing, 31 PEPP. L.
REV. 949 (2003-2004); Aileen Mc Harg, Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest:

Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights, 62

MOD.

L. REV. 671 (1999); Franklin R. Liss, A Mandate to

Balance: JudicialProtection of Individual Rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, 41 EMoRY L. J. 1281 (1992). See also, C. Raj Kumar, Human Rights Implications of

National Security Laws in India: Combating Terrorism while Preserving Civil Liberties, 33
DENV. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 195 (2004-2005) (for a summary of the debates on this issue during
the framing of India's Constitution).
20 Cass R. Sunstein, Testing Minimalism:A Reply, 104 MIcH. L. REV. 123, 124 (20o6).
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(a) Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review and the CounterMajoritarian Difficulty
The counter-majoritarian difficulty challenges the democratic legitimacy
of judicial review and essentially asks: why should judges have the power
of striking down laws made by democratically accountable branches of the
state? 2 1 Minimalism is presented as a means of reconciling this judicial
power with democratic values.22 The minimalist strategy advocates that the
judiciary should give all possible deference to the political branches,23 but
where this is not possible, the judicial role should be limited to deciding
the narrow dispute between the parties, leaving larger questions open for
democratic settlement.24
According to theories of minimalism, this is the best account of judicial
review in a democratic polity as it gives space for political discourse
on the issue, instead of taking matters away from the political arena. 2 5
Therefore, minimalism is the practice of "saying no more than necessary
to justify an outcome, and leaving as much as possible undecided [so as
6
to] promote more democracy and more deliberation".2
Sunstein refers
to this approach as the democracy-protecting minimalist strategy. He
also advocates the use of democracy-promoting minimalist strategies,
arguing that the judiciary should not only refuse to interfere in democratic
deliberations, but should also actively decide in a manner such that
democratic deliberations are promoted. This democracy-promoting
strategy deals with the content of judicial decisions, and favours those
outcomes which enhance democratic deliberations. Therefore, Sunstein
argues in favour of striking down those enactments and actions that do
not conform to procedures meant for sustaining and enhancing democratic
21
22

Molot, supra note 8, at 1754-55. See also, Bickel, supra note 3.
See contra, Owen Fiss, The Perils of Minimalism, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 643, 647-48,

658-59 (20o8) (arguing that this form of reasoning reduces democracy to majoritarianism;
and that judicial review does not close off democratic deliberation, but defines the scope of
deliberation, thus giving it "a certain vitality"). See also, RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES
133-34 (2oo6) (stating that a majoritarian government is democratic only if it protects the
fundamental values of the polity from the tyranny of the majority).
23 This issue was debated as far back as 1893, when James Bradley Thayer advocated that
the Court should give all possible deference to Congress's interpretation of the Constitution.
See, James B. Thayer, Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
24 SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 3-4. See contra, Seigel, supra note 14, at 2010. (arguing that in
"leaving issues to the democratic process and promoting democratic deliberation, minimalist

Justices often simply postpone the questions they do not decide for future litigation").
25

Fiss, supra note 23, at 647.

26

SUNSTEIN,

supra note 8, at 3-4.
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deliberations, like on grounds of non-application of mind, vagueness,
excessive delegation, mala fides, etc. 2 7
(b) Realist concerns over the constraining power of legal
reasoning
In the aftermath of the legal realism movement, scholars lost faith in
the determinacy of law and the constraining power of legal reasoning.28
As formalism stood discredited, the argument was that in the guise of
legal reasoning, judges were advocating personal preferences. If this were
the case, and if judges could not be trusted to decide cases based on legal
principles, minimalist strategies were advocated as the means whereby
courts could at least be made to confine the scope of their decisions, and
decide as little as possible.29
(c) To reduce costs ofjudicial decisions30
Sunstein in particular sees two types of costs associated with nonminimalist decisions: decision costs and error costs. 3 1 Decision costs are
the costs associated with arriving at a broad decision, and include the time
and research required to make an accurate decision on broad issues with
far-reaching impact. Further, decisions can be wrong, and the broader the
decision, the higher the costs of a wrong decision.32 Therefore, minimalism
as an approach to decision-making advocates taking the narrow view
to minimize the costs of a wrong decision. Minimalism is specifically
advocated where judges are not confident that they have reached the
correct decision.33 Sunstein's broader claim is that minimalism will make

SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 3-4. See also, See, Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New
JudicialMinimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1456 (2000), at 1463.
27

2s

Molot, supra note 8, at 1767.

29

Molot, supra note 8, at 1757.

Fiss, supra note 23, at 646. Fiss also argues that the minimalist strategy itself imposes
severe costs through "the cycles of litigation ... and the resources consumed by the judicial
and legislative branches". Id at 658-59. See also, RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 13334 (2oo6) (stating that a majoritarian government is democratic only if it protects the
fundamental values of the polity from the tyranny of the majority), at 657.
31 Cass R. Sunstein, Second - Order Perfectionism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2867, 2874
30

(2oo6-2007).

supra note 8, at 4.
Charles A. Kelbley, Privacy, Minimalism, and Perfectionism, 75

32 SUNSTEIN,
33

2955 (2oo6-2007).

FORDHAM

L.

REV.

2951,
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the possibility of wrong decisions less frequent, and their effects less
damaging.34
(d) As a decision-making strategy
Minimalism is seen as a tool for reaching a consensus among people
with divergent views.35 This is particularly emphasized where there is deep
disagreement over the issue in question. Minimalism, as a decision-making
strategy, advocates basing the decision on the narrowest possible grounds,
while leaving the broader questions open, so as to reach a consensus on
the issue.36
B. Facets of minimalist decision-making
Based on the concerns highlighted above, and both as a prescriptive
strategy as well as descriptive theory, the following tools for decisionmaking are associated with minimalism:
1. As far as possible, declining substantive review of actions of
political branches.37
2. Deciding on narrow technical grounds rather than on broad
principles.
8
3. Deciding on statutory rather than constitutional grounds,3
and engaging in statutory interpretation rather than constitutional adjudication.

4. Deciding on procedural issues rather than substantive
grounds.39
supra note 8, at 4 (minimalism is likely to make judicial errors less frequent
and (above all) less damaging"). See contra, Seigel, supra note 14, at 20o6 ("As a general

34 SUNSTEIN,

matter, there seems to be little reason to suppose that overall costs in the legal and political

system will be minimized by a Supreme Court that decides cases as narrowly and shallowly
as reasonably possible").

35SUNSTEIN,

supra note 8, at 10-11.

36 Kelbley, supra note 34, at 2955.
37BICKEL, supra note 3.
38 Fiss, supra note 23, at 646; Kelbley, supra note 34, at 2954.
39 See for e.g., SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR
AMERICA 97 (2oo5). (arguing that privacy cases like Griswold v. Connecticut and Lawrence
v. Texas should have been decided on the ground of desuetude rather than through an
articulation of the right of privacy). See also, Kelbley, supra note 34, at 2960, arguing
that Sunstein's reasoning reveals that minimalists should decide, as far as possible, on
procedural rather than substantive grounds.
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5. Providing strong deference to the views of the political
branches on what is constitutional,40 and/or leaving broader
constitutional issues undecided.
6. Confining the decision as far as possible to the facts of the
case. 41
7. Giving advice rather than binding decisions, so that while the
court engages in, it also defers to the political branches in,
the resolution of a constitutional dispute.42
8. Review actions of the political branches to ensure compliance
with procedures for democratic deliberation.
Minimalism is therefore an incremental, gradual, cautious, one-case-ata-time approach to judicial decision-making. It sees the role of courts, not
as giving meaning to and protecting constitutional values, but as a dispute
resolver charged with the duty of deciding specific disputes without
engaging in broader constitutional deliberations.43

III.

"COURTING TERROR": CONSTITUTIONAL

ADJUDICATION IN TERROR-RELATED CASES

Minimalism as an approach to decision-making appears to be very
popular in times of national emergencies. Both Owen Fiss and Cass
Sunstein have described the minimalist approach of the U.S. Supreme
Court in such situations, Fiss decrying the practice and Sunstein
celebrating it.44 Sunstein in particular describes three broad categories
of approaches in the face of national security concerns: National
supra note 8, at 26. Kelbley, supra note 34, at 2961 (referring to Justice Holmes'
"Puke Test" which states that a statute is unconstitutional only if it makes you want to throw
up).
41 Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875,
887 (2003). See also, Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 1oo
4o SUNSTEIN,

COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1456 (2000), at 1465.
42 See, Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1710 (1998).
43 Fiss, supra note 23, at 647. See also, Seigel, supra note 14, at 2004.
44 See, contra, Owen Fiss, The Perils of Minimalism, 9 THEORETICAL I NQ. L. 643, 647-48,

658-59 (20o8) (arguing that this form of reasoning reduces democracy to majoritarianism;
and that judicial review does not close off democratic deliberation, but defines the scope of
deliberation, thus giving it "a certain vitality"). See also, RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES
133-34 (2oo6) (stating that a majoritarian government is democratic only if it protects
the fundamental values of the polity from the tyranny of the majority), Cass R. Sunstein,
Minimalism at War, Supreme Court Review (Forthcoming) available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 629285.

112

THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH TO TERROR-RELATED ADJUDICATION

Security Maximalism, Liberty Maximalism and Minimalism.45 The
three approaches can be seen as part of a single continuum, national
security maximalism and liberty maximalism forming polar opposites
and minimalism occupying the intermediate space. National security
maximalists see a highly deferential role for the judiciary in the face of
national security threats, on the ground that the political branches have
to do all they can to protect the country. Liberty maximalists on the
other hand insist that just as in times of peace, in times of war too, the
role of the judiciary is to protect constitutional rights and liberties- in
fact more so in times of war, as they are more under threat.46 Following
an intermediate approach minimalists insist that their role is to ensure
compliance of the state with "Due Process Writ Large" - which Sunstein
defined in terms of an emphasis on clear legal standards, compliance with
procedural rules and safeguards, and balancing national security concerns
with protection of civil liberties in a manner that prevents over-reaching
on either end.47 Sunstein goes on to describe how a large part of American
constitutional history in times of national security threats reflects a
minimalist approach of courts to adjudication. Interestingly, we have found
that as a matter of description, this applies to India as well.
We have looked at the prevalence of minimalist decision-making in
terrorism-related cases in India. Our focus has been on cases where courts
were called upon to adjudicate between the competing claims of national
security on the one hand and civil liberties on the other.48 Therefore,
our analysis is confined to those cases where the constitutionality of a
See, contra, Owen Fiss, The Perils of Minimalism, 9 THEORETICAL I NQ. L. 643, 647-48,
658-59 (20o8) (arguing that this form of reasoning reduces democracy to majoritarianism;
and that judicial review does not close off democratic deliberation, but defines the scope of
deliberation, thus giving it "a certain vitality"). See also, RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES
133-34 (2oo6) (stating that a majoritarian government is democratic only if it protects
the fundamental values of the polity from the tyranny of the majority), Cass R. Sunstein,
Minimalism at War, Supreme Court Review (Forthcoming) available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 629285, at 3.
45

46

Fiss, supra note 23, at 647-48, 658-59 (2oo8); Dworkin, supra note 23, at 133-34;

Sunstein, Minimalism at War, Supreme Court Review (Forthcoming) available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=629285, at 3.
47 Sunstein, Minimalism at War, at 4.
48 On testing cases for features of minimalism, see Neil S. Seigel, A Theory in Search of a
Court and Itself: JudicialMinimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L.

REV.

1951,

1958 (2004-2005), at 1963 (arguing that a falsifiable and therefore operational definition
of minimalism must have the following two components: "it must (a) result from the
(apparently) international choice by a majority of the Justices (b) to decide a case on the
narrowest and shallowest grounds reasonably open to them, even though broader and
deeper rationale(s) were reasonably available").
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terror-related enactment or of an action under such enactment was in
question. We have tested these judgments for features of minimalist
decision-making outlined above. It is pertinent to note here that, as Cass
Sunstein has himself acknowledged as a descriptive matter, the minimalist
approach cannot be tested on absolute standards but on relative grounds.49
Therefore as a description of judicial practice, minimalism is often a
tendency to decide on narrower (rather than broader) and shallower
(rather than deeper) grounds and might not in all cases reflect decisionmaking on the narrowest (rather than broadest) or shallowest (rather
than deepest) grounds.o In our analysis therefore, we have looked for the
prevalence of one or more facets of minimalist decision-making outlined
above.
As elaborated below, we find that in terror-related constitutional
adjudication the Supreme Court has tended towards identifying its role
as a mediator between the competing claims of national security and
Fundamental Rights; rather than as a guardian of Fundamental Rights.
It broadly defers to legislative wisdom on where the line between the two
should be drawn and does not engage in the larger debate on the extent
of intrusion permissible into the protected realm of civil liberties. The
Court also tends to check for procedural safeguards and compliance rather
than substantive review of provisions. It prefers to engage in statutory
interpretation rather than constitutional adjudication in deciding upon the
vires of particular provisions. It exercises limited review of legislatively
mandated principles but is open to reviewing executive action to ensure
compliance with such principles. It thus prefers to resolve disputes
between the citizen and the state in individual fact situations rather than
make broader statements on rights and entitlements guaranteed by the
polity.
In this segment, before reviewing the terror-related jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court, we will first look at the approach of the Court more
generally to the issue of national security vis-A-vis Fundamental Rights.
Our attempt is to show the similarities in its approach to adjudication in
national security related issues (of which terrorism forms one part) from
1950 onwards.
49

Sunstein, Minimalism at War, at 28.

5o

See, Sunstein, Testing Minimalism, at

125

(replying to Neil S. Seigel, A Theory in Search
MICH. L. REV.

of a Court and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103
1951,

1958

(2004-2005)).
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A. The Supreme Court's Approach to National Security vis-h-vis
Fundamental Rights
The interface between national security and civil liberties initially came
up before courts in matters pertaining to preventive detention. From
1950's to the mid 1980's various preventive detention legislations as well
as executive actions under these legislations were challenged before the
Supreme Court, and these formed the focal point of the debate between
national security and civil liberties. With the enactment of specific antiterror laws in the mid-198o's, the focus shifted from preventive detention
to state action in the context of terrorism.51
In national security related adjudication, the Indian Supreme Court
has seen a narrow role for itself, limited to negotiating between the
competing claims of national security and civil liberties protection.
A good example of this policy was evident in S.P. Gupta v. Union of
India.52 Here the Court quoted with approval, a passage from State of
Rajasthan v. Union of India53 wherein the Supreme Court had held that
the role of the judiciary was to "uphold constitutional values and enforce
constitutional limitations",54 and for this purpose, it was precluded from
declaring a 'judicial hands-off' even in cases involving political questions.
After articulating this broad principle however, the Court in S.P. Gupta
carved out a limitation on judicial deliberation of certain issues, including
national security.55 In essence therefore, the Court saw a different and
much narrower role for itself in cases involving national security.
The Supreme Court has fulfilled this narrow mediating role by
granting broad deference to the political wings in dealing with national
security concerns on the one hand; and focusing on ensuring procedural
compliance and minimization of misuse, instead of engaging in a
substantive rights review. The deferential approach to political wings was
51 See

generally, Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalized Emergency:
Preventive Detention and Personal Liberty in India, 22 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 311 (2000-2001),
Anil Kalhan et. al., Colonial Continuities:Human Rights, Terrorism, and Security Laws in
India, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 93 (2oo6-2007) (on the continuity between preventive detention
laws and anti-terror laws).
52 S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87 : AIR 1982 SC 149 (Supreme Court of
India).
53

State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 SCC

592

: AIR 1977 SC 1361, T 154 (Supreme

Court of India).
54Id.
55 S.P. Gupta v. President of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87 : AIR
Court of India).

1982

SC 149, T 982 (Supreme
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very much in evidence in the national security related preventive detention
cases of the 1950's, 6o's and 70's. In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras,6
for example, the Court upheld the vires of the Preventive Detention Act,
1950, by rejecting a due process interpretation of the phrase 'procedure
established by law' in Article 21.57 The Court held that any procedure
enacted by Parliament to deprive a person of his right to life or personal
liberty, came within the purview of Article 21 and was constitutionally
valid.68 It felt that the substantive justness and reasonableness of the
procedure was for the Parliament to consider.59 The Court therefore
provided broad deference to the legislative branch in enacting legislation
depriving citizens of their life and liberty, and declined to replace
legislative wisdom on the fairness of such legislation with its own
understanding.60
This broad deference to the political wings was also evident in Makhan
6
Singh v. Punjab,'
1 and Sadanandan v. State of Kerala.62 These cases
related to preventive detention under the Defence of India Ordinance and
arose during the subsistence of a Proclamation of Emergency, whereunder
the enforcement of certain Fundamental Rights had been suspended.
The Supreme Court emphasized that the determination of whether the
conditions justifying the Emergency were still prevalent, how long the
Emergency should be in force and what rights ought to be suspended
during an Emergency should be left to the executive, and courts should
not interfere in such determinations. It was held that effective safeguard
against abuse of executive powers "is ultimately to be found in the
existence of enlightened, vigilant and vocal public opinion".63 This was
another example of deference to, and faith in the democratic forces as
against judicial regulation.
Another facet of minimalism, that of declining substantive rights review
but assessing procedural compliance, is also a theme that runs through
both these cases. The petitioners in both cases challenged their preventive
detention orders for violation of Fundamental Rights. Declining to decide
A.K. Gopalan v. Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 (Overruled) (Supreme Court of India)
[Hereinafter 'Gopalan'].
57 Gopalan, at T 16.
58 Gopalan, at T 305.
59 Gopalan, at T 23.
60 Gopalan, at
T 23.
61 Makhan Singh v. Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 381 (Supreme Court of India).
62 Sadanandan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1925 (Supreme Court of
India).
63 Makhan Singh v. Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 381, T 49 (Supreme Court of India).
,6
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the merits of the claims on the ground that the petitioners were precluded
from bringing a claim to enforce Fundamental Rights by virtue of orders
under Article 359, the Supreme Court further ruled that the decision to
pass a detention order was dependent on the subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority.64 Nevertheless, the Court held that it could examine
the detention order to ensure compliance with statutory safeguards, 65
and on grounds of mala fide, excessive delegation and non-application
of mind. 66 The emphasis was therefore clearly on ensuring procedural
compliance.7
The focus on procedural compliance was also present in the 1974 case
of Haradhan Saha v. State of WB., 68 where the constitutionality of the
next law to provide for preventive detention, the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act [hereinafter "MISA"], was challenged. The petitioners claimed
that the Act was unreasonable because it provided unguided power to the
State to preventively detain a person, as the grounds for detention were
very broad and had not been defined. 69 Further, there were no standards
for the objective assessment of the grounds for such detention. Second,
the petitioners contended that the Act violated Article 21 because the
detenu was not given a proper right to be heard. Third, it was contended
that Article 22 (5) was violated because the Act did not provide for the
machinery or just procedure to give effect to this Article. Fourthly, the Act
was said to violate Article 14 because it permitted discrimination in how
the government chose to deal with the offence.
Rejecting these claims, the Court held that the grounds on which a
person could be detained were not vague and that it was permissible to
detain a person for an act which was not by itself an offence under any
Sadanandan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1925, T 20 (Supreme Court of India)
[Hereinafter 'Sadanandan'].

64
65
66

Sadanandan,at T 14.
Sadanandan,at T T 13-14.

67 This reasoning of the Court is also akin to Sunstein's understanding of democracy-

promoting minimalism, where the court strikes down legislation on grounds that the other
branches have not complied with norms of democratic deliberation. Sunstein had examined
decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut and Lawrence v. Texas and argued that a minimalist
approach to the cases would have decided the issues on grounds of desuetude rather than on
the substantive right to privacy.
68

Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B., (1975) 3 SCC 198 (Supreme Court of India).

Section 3, MISA provided for detention on grounds of preventing a person from acting in
any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or
the security of India, or the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or the
maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.
69
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penal statute.70 The focus of the Court, in testing the reasonableness of the
provisions, was on examining whether there were sufficient procedures
for the detenu to make a representation. The Court stated that procedural
reasonableness could not be tested against abstract notions but had to be
'judged in the context of the urgency and the magnitude of the problem,
the underlying purpose of the restrictions and the prevailing conditions".:,
On this basis, the Court rejected the contention that principles of natural
justice have to be complied with in all procedures, and held that "if a
statutory provision excludes the application of any or all the principles
of naturaljustice then the court does not completely ignore the mandate
of the Legislature".72 Accordingly, it held that as long as the Government
and the Advisory Board gave proper consideration to the detenu's
representation, and there was no abuse of discretion, the requirement
of reasonableness73 and fairness74 was complied with, and thus there
was no additional duty to disclose any evidence to the detenu,75 or make
a speaking order.76 Executive action in individual cases could however
be challenged on the grounds that the detenu had not been given the
opportunity to make a representation or that the detaining authority had
abused the power of detention.77
Therefore, in HaradhanSaha, the Court deferred to legislative wisdom
in determining the reasonableness of procedures. It did not test the
provisions of MISA for substantive reasonableness but limited its scrutiny
to compliance with Article 22 restrictions. However, it left the window
open for a detenu to challenge executive action in individual cases for noncompliance with MISA procedures.
At about the same time as HaradhanSaha, the Supreme Court decided
another case under MISA, this one directly relating to terrorism. Giani
8 decided by the Court in 1973, dealt
Bakshish Singh v. Govt. of India,7
with a British citizen of Indian origin, who had allegedly addressed secret
Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B., (1975) 3 SCC 198, T 22 (Supreme Court of India)
[Hereinafter 'Haradhan'].
71 Haradhan,at T 28.
72 Haradhan,at T 30.
73 Haradhan,at T 28.
74 Haradhan,at T 30.
75 Haradhan,at T 30.
76 Haradhan,at T 26.
77Haradhan,at T 31.
71 Giani Bakshish Singh v. Govt. of India, (1973) 2 SCC 688 : AIR 1973 SC 2667 (Supreme
Court of India) [Hereinafter 'Giani Bakshish'].
70
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meetings for planning the use of force to effect Punjab's secession from
India. He was preventively detained by the Government on these charges
under the MISA, but was not charged for the commission of any crime.
Before the Supreme Court, the Government argued that if released, the
petitioner would return to England and indulge in prejudicial activities
against India, which was why he had been detained. The Court refused
to review the detention order on merits, stating that it would not review
the truth or sufficiency of the grounds of detention,79 and could not test
compliance with Article 22 by virtue of the existence of a Proclamation of
Emergency.8o It therefore confined itself to interpreting clauses (a) and (b)
of Section 3(1), MISA, and concluded that the state had the power under
the said sections to detain a foreigner for purposes other than expelling
him for the country.",

Another case of note in relation to MISA is A.D.M., Jabalpur v.
Shivkant Shukla,8 2 which exhibits in many ways, the vanishing point of
minimalism. During the Emergency of 1975-77, the enforcement of Articles
8
14, 21 and 22 was suspended. 3

However, relying on the precedent in Makhan Singh,8 4 various High
Courts in the country ruled that they had the right to issue the writ of
habeas corpus in cases of preventive detention, if they found an order
of detention to be mala fide, or passed by an authority not empowered
to pass such an order, or passed in excess of the power delegated to the
concerned authority.' On appeal, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court
ruled that courts did not have the power to review orders of detention,
even if they were ultra vires the legislation under which they had been
imposed or on grounds of mala fide, since exercising such a review, and
granting the writ of habeas corpus would amount to the enforcement
of Article 21 which was suspended during the Emergency. In coming to
this conclusion, the Court upheld the contention of the State that Article
21 is the sole repository of the right to life and personal liberty, and that
"[l]iberty is itself the gift of the law and may by the law be forfeited
Giani Bakshish, at T 2.
So Giani Bakshish, at T 6.
7

Si Giani Bakshish, at T 4.
s2 A.D.M., Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521 : AIR 1976 SC 1207 (Supreme
Court of India).
*

IMTIAZ OMAR, EMERGENCY POWERS AND THE COURTS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 99.

14

Makhan Singh v. Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 381 (Supreme Court of India).
Omar, supra note 84, at loo.
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or abridged"."' On the same reasoning, it was also held that neither the
Court, nor the detenu could ask for the grounds for detention.?
Defining the role of the Court as that of navigating between the
competing interests of the individual and the government, the Court
opined that though it was competent to undertake this exercise under
normal circumstances,"" "[i]n period[s] of public danger or apprehension
the protective law which gives every man security and confidence in
times of tranquility, has to give way to interests of the State",8 9 and
the Court could not weigh the "competing claims of individuals and
government" in such extraordinary situations because it was ill-equipped
to determine whether a certain set of events constituted an "Emergency,"
whether there was a genuine threat to national security, and the extent
to which this required government control over individual liberty.90 The
extreme deference-some call it abdication9l or surrender92- of the Court
to the political branches is exemplified by the statement of Justice Beg,
speaking for the majority, when he opined that "the care and concern
bestowed by the State authorities upon the welfare of detenues who are
well - housed, well - fed and well - treated, is almost maternal".93
With the end of the Emergency in 1977, the hugely unpopular MISA was
repealed in 1978.94 In 1980 however, another law on preventive detention,
the National Security Ordinance, was promulgated. It was subsequently
replaced by the National Security Act, 1980. The vires of the Ordinance
and certain provisions of the Act were challenged in A.K. Roy v. Union
of India.95 The Petitioners inter alia challenged the justness of the Act,
impugned the vagueness of the grounds of detention and questioned the
86Makhan Singh v. Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 381, T 35 (Supreme Court of India).
7A.D.M., Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521, T 138 (Supreme Court of India)
[Hereinafter 'A.D.M., Jabalpur'].
* A.D.M., Jabalpur,at T 45.
19A.D.M., Jabalpur,at T 44.
90

A.D.M., Jabalpur,at T 45.

91Justice Ruma Pal, Judicial Oversight or Overreach: The Role of the Judiciary in
ContemporaryIndia, (2oo8) 7 SCC J-9, J-18.

92See, S.P. Sathe, Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience, 6

WASH.

U. J. L. & PoL'Y

29

(2001).

93 Beg J. (as he then was) in A.D.M., Jabalpur,at T 324-A.

See, generally, Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalized Emergency:
Preventive Detention and Personal Liberty in India, 22 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 311 (2000-2001),
Anil Kalhan et. al., Colonial Continuities:Human Rights, Terrorism, and Security Laws in
India, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 93 (2oo6-2007) (on the continuity between preventive detention
laws and anti-terror laws). (On the history of MISA and its repeal.).
95 A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271 (Supreme Court of India) [Hereinafter A.K.
Roy'].
94
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reasonableness of the procedures prescribed under the Act. The Court
refused to go into the 'justness" of having a law on preventive detention,
first on the ground that the Constitution itself provided for preventive
detention, and secondly on the reasoning that its power of judicial review
did not extend so far.96 The Court also rejected the contention that the
grounds for preventive detention under the Act were vague and imprecise.
Arguing that the very nature of the harm sought to be prevented by
the Act made it difficult to give a concrete meaning to the terms used,
the Court felt that a certain amount of latitude had to be given to the
Legislature in this matter. However, it held that when individual cases
were brought before courts, they would construe the terms very narrowly.97
Therefore the Court upheld the provision, on the understanding that there
was always scope for judicial correction of executive error in individual
cases.98 It also upheld the reasonableness of the procedures, first by
clarifying that both the reasonableness of procedures and the content of
principles of natural justice were context specific and not immutable;99
and secondly by reading in safeguards,100 and engaging in statutory
construction.o1 The Court therefore held that a detenu did not have the
right to legal representation,102 the right to cross-examination,103 or the
right to a public trial,104 since the Constitution did not mandate it and the
Act did not provide for it, and that the non-availability of these rights did
not impinge upon the reasonableness of the procedures under the Act.
Preventive detention under the National Security Act, on grounds
of engaging in terrorist activities was in question in State of Punjab v.
Sukhpal Singh.o5 Declining to question the subjective satisfaction of the

detaining authority on whether this was a fit case for detention, the Court
limited its role to ascertaining compliance with procedural requirements
under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.1o 6 This understanding
of the Court's role was reached based on the reasoning that "[t]hose who
are responsiblefor the nationalsecurity or for the maintenance of public
96A.K. Roy v. Union of India,
97A.K. Roy, at T 63.

98A.K. Roy,

at T 63.

99A.K. Roy,

at T T 84, 101.

(1982) 1

SCC 271, T T 34-38 (Supreme Court of India).

A.K. Roy, at T T 8o, 93, 94, 1o8.
11 A.K. Roy, at T 86-88.
102 A.K. Roy,
at T 93.
1o3 A.K. Roy, at T 99.
104 A.K. Roy, at T 1o6.
1oI State of Punjab v. Sukhpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 35 (Supreme Court of India).
1o6 Id, AIR 1990 SC 231, T 9 (Supreme Court of India).
1oo
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order must be the judges of what the national security or public order
requires" and therefore "the Court cannot examine the materials before it
and find that the detaining authority should not have been satisfied on the
materials before it and detain the detenu".o7

Not all of these cases on prevention detention were directly on the issue
of terrorism, but they do exhibit a tendency of taking a hands-off approach
to national security, providing broad deference to the political branches on
such matters, and focusing on ensuring procedural compliance rather than
substantive review.
B. Judicial Review of Anti-Terror Legislations
In 1985 Parliament enacted, and in 1987 extended, the Terrorism and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act [hereinafter "TADA"], to "make
special provisionsfor the prevention of andfor coping with, terroristand
disruptive activities".10 The Act, inter alia, defined, and provided penalty
for, terrorist and disruptive activities, created a special adjudicatory
structure to deal with cases arising under the Act and defined powers of
designated Courts under the Act, provided special investigative procedures
and laid down special evidentiary rules. TADA lapsed in 1995. In 2000,
the President promulgated the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance.
The Ordinance was enacted into legislation in 2002, in the form of the
Prevention of Terrorism Act [hereinafter "POTA"]. After an existence
of two years, POTA was repealed in 2004. The Constitutional validity of
both Acts was challenged in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjablo9 [hereinafter
"Kartar Singh"] and Peoples' Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India,1o
[hereinafter "P.U.C.L."] respectively. There were two other legislations
that have a bearing on terror-related issues, and whose constitutionality
was challenged before the Supreme Court. One was the Armed Forces
(Special Powers) Act, 1958, whose constitutional vires was challenged in
Naga People's Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India [hereinafter

State of Punjab v. Sukhpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 35 : AIR 1990 SC 231, T 9 (Supreme Court
of India).
"o See, Preamble to the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985.
1o7

1o9Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 (Supreme Court of India) [Hereinafter

'KartarSingh'].
"o Peoples' Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India,
India).

(2004)

9 SCC 580 (Supreme Court of
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"Naga Peoples' Movement"];-

the other was the Maharashtra Control of

Organised Crime Act, 1999 [hereinafter "MCOCA"], whose constitutional
challenge was heard and decided by the Supreme Court in State of
Maharashtrav. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah [hereinafter "Bharat Shah"].112
The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act was enacted to enable the armed
forces to exercise certain special policing powers in "disturbedareas," as
defined by notification. Through Notification, it was inter alia extended to
the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram,
Nagaland and Tripura.113 MCOCA on the other hand was enacted to deal
with organized crime, but is frequently used for prosecuting terrorrelated cases as well. Taken together, these four cases form the crux of the
constitutionality review of anti-terror enactments. Interestingly all four
cases show a remarkable degree of consistency in applying the minimalist
approach, as will be examined below.
In both Kartar Singh as well as P.U.C.L., instead of deciding on the
broad issue of if, and to what extent, national interests and security
concerns can trump civil liberties, and whether whittling down procedural
and evidentiary safeguards was a constitutionally just means for
combating terror, the Court deferred to the legislature on the need for
the enactment, 114 and confined itself, as shall be seen below, to examining
whether the provisions of the Act had enough procedural safeguards
to ensure compliance with due process. Refusing to go into the need for
enacting a special anti-terror law, the Court deferred to Parliament's
assessment that "to face terrorism we need new approaches, techniques,
weapons, expertise and of course new laws"115 and that "a new antiterrorism law is necessary for a better future".116 The Court made it
clear that it would not look into need for special terror legislations, or the
potential for abuse, in deciding constitutionality.

Naga People's Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India, (1998) 2 SCC 109 (Supreme

Court of India).
"I State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah, (2oo8) 13 SCC 5 (Supreme Court of
India).
11 Naga People's Movement, at T2.
114 PUCL v. Union of India, (2004) 9 SCC 580, T 22 (Supreme Court of India) (Another issue
that the Petitioner has raised at the threshold is the alleged misuse of TADA and the large
number of acquittals of the accused charged under TADA. Here we would like to point out
that this Court cannot go into and examine the 'need' of POTA. It is a matter of policy).
n1 PUCL, at T 9.
16

Id.
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These cases highlight again the Court's self-understanding of its role
as that of performing a balancing act between national security concerns
and the protection of Fundamental Rights. Therefore in Kartar Singh, the
Court pointed out that while
[t]he liberty of a citizen must be zealously safeguarded by
the courts; nonetheless the courts while dispensing justice
in cases like the one under the TADA Act, should keep
in mind not only the liberty of the accused but also the
interest of the victim and their near and dear and above
all the collective interest of the community and the safety
of the nation so that the public may not lose faith in the
system of judicial administration and indulge in private
retribution.117
Similarly, in P.U.C.L. the Court on the one hand acknowledged the need
for the protection and promotion of human rights in the fight against
terror; but on the other, viewed terrorism itself as "an assault of basic
rights.",," In light of this, it felt that its own responsibility was to maintain

a "delicate balance" between protecting "'core' human rights" and State
action in fighting terrorism.119 The Court also stated that it would judge the
constitutionality of P.O.T.A. keeping these considerations in mind.120
In keeping with this understanding of its role, the Court took the
following actions in Kartar Singh, P.U.C.L., Naga People's Movement
and Bharat Shah, (apart from determining the legislative competence of
the concerned legislatures to enact the laws (in all cases in favour of the
respective legislatures)):
(a) Upheld those provisions that had inbuilt procedural
safeguards, and exhibited a nexus to the object of the Act
Examples include Section 11, T.A.D.A., which gave the executive
the power to transfer cases from one court to another without giving
the accused a right of hearing. However, the concurrence of the Chief
Justice of India was required for this purpose, and this was held to be an
adequate safeguard, negating the requirement of audi alteram partem.
117

Kartar Singh, at T 351.

1s PUCL, at T 15.
120 Id.

x~o
Id.
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Similarly, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Sections 3 and 4,
T.A.D.A., which defined and punished terrorist and disruptive activities
respectively, negating the contention that the two sections cover acts which
constitute offences under ordinary laws and there was no guiding principle
as to when the executive should proceed under TADA or the general
laws. It was held that in cases of this nature, which provide for stringent
punishment, sufficient materials linking the acts to the purpose for which
the enactment was brought about, has to be produced. This was held to
be sufficient guidance for distinguishing between T.A.D.A. crimes and
ordinary ones.
In P.U.C.L., section 14 P.O.T.A., which permitted a police officer to
compel any person to furnish information was challenged as being
violative of Articles 14, 19, 20(3), and 21. The Court however held that

since the section required that such information could be asked only
after obtaining a written approval from an officer not below the rank
of Superintendent of Police, and since such a provision was necessary
for the detection of terrorist activities, sufficient safeguards existed and
hence the section was not unconstitutional.121 Similarly, the Court upheld
Sections 18 and 19, dealing with the notification and de-notification of
terrorist organizations, on the grounds that first, such a provision was
necessary to protect the unity and sovereignty of India and was therefore
a reasonable restriction under Article 19(4). Second, that there might be
occasions when the Government felt the need to declare an organization
a terrorist organization without waiting to give them an opportunity to
be heard; and thirdly, that even though there was no provision for predecisional hearings, the principle of audi alteram partem was not violated
as there was provision for post-decisional hearings.122 In the same vein,
Section 27 (power to direct the accused to give bodily samples);123 Section
30 (keeping identity of witnesses secret);124 and Section 32 (admissibility
of confessions made to police officers);125 were upheld on the grounds that
these provisions were needed to combat terror, and that there were enough
procedural safeguards to ensure that they were not misused.

PUCL,
PUCL,
123 PUCL,
124 PUCL,
125PUCL,
121
122

at T T 36-38.
at T T 40-44.
at T T 50-53.
at T T 54-61.
at T T 62-64.

NLSIR | SPECIAL ISSUE | 2013

125

In Naga People's Movement, dealing with the constitutional challenge to
Section 4(a) of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act,121 the Court ruled
that the conferment of wide powers to the armed forces is neither arbitrary
nor unreasonable. It came to this conclusion based on the fact that the
powers under the section could be exercised only on the satisfaction of all
the conditions mentioned in the section.127
Taking a similar approach, in Bharat Shah, Sections 13-16 dealing with
the interception of wire, electronic and oral communication was held as
not violative of the right to privacy, because first, these provisions were
intended to help in the prevention of organized crime and/or evidence
collection; and secondly, there were sufficient safeguards built into the
provisions.128

(b) Upheld Constitutionality of provisions, but laid down
procedural safeguards to prevent misuse
In Kartar Singh, Section 8, TADA, relating to the forfeiture of certain
types of property, was challenged on the ground that there were no
guidelines on when this could be done, which rendered the provision
arbitrary. It was also argued that forfeiture might hurt the interests of
innocent third persons. The Court, while upholding the provision, laid
down guidelines for exercise of the forfeiture power.129 Similarly, in
upholding the constitutionality of Section 15, which made confessions to
a police officer admissible in court, the Supreme Court found that such
a provision was required in light of national security concerns, but laid
down detailed procedural guidelines to prevent misuse.130
In Naga People's Movement, dealing with the constitutionality of
Section 4 of the impugned legislation, which gave the army wide powers
The section reads: Section 4: Special Powers of the armed forces - Any
commissioned officer, warrant officer, non- commissioned officer or any other person of
equivalent rank in the armed forces may, in a disturbed area - (a) if he is of the opinion that
it is necessary so to do for the maintenance of public order, after giving such due warning
as he may consider necessary, fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the causing of death,
against any person who is acting in contravention of any law or order for the time being in
force in the disturbed areas prohibiting the assembly of five or more persons or the carrying
of weapons or of things capable of being used as weapons or of firearms, ammunition or
explosive substances.
127Naga People's Movement, at T 46.
121State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah, (20o8) 13 SCC 5 (Supreme Court of
126
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to open fire, arrest, search, as well as destroy structures where absconders
or armed volunteers took shelter or were trained, the Court prescribed a
list of "Do's and Don't's"while acting under the legislation.131 It agreed with
the Attorney General that these instructions would provide an effective
check against misuse or abuse of the provisions.132
(c) Upheld constitutionality of provisions by engaging in
statutory interpretation to read in clauses so as to meet
constitutionality requirements
In both Kartar Singh as well as P.U.C.L., the Court read in the
requirement of mens rea into the definition of abetment in T.A.D.A. and
P.O.T.A. respectively.133 Kartar Singh interpreted Section 5, which made
the possession of specified arms and ammunition a substantive offence,
to include only those instances where such possession was in connection
with the use thereof in terrorist or disruptive activities.134 Similarly, in
P.U.C.L., a knowledge requirement was read into Section 4, P.O.T.A. which
dealt with the same issue of possession of arms. 135 Mens rea requirements
were also read into Sections 20, 21, and 22, P.O.T.A. dealing with certain
associative crimes.136
In Bharat Shah, intention and knowledge requirements were read into
Sections 3(3) and 3(5), M.C.O.C.A., dealing with crimes of harbouring a
member of an organized crime syndicate, and using proceeds of organized
crime, respectively.137 The Court also read in the phrase "after coming into
force of the Act" after "at any time" into Section 4, M.C.O.C.A., to protect
it from the vice of retroactivity.13 8
(d) Upheld provisions, but made recommendations to the
political branches to strengthen the legislative framework
Where the Court felt that the provisions might be open to misuse or
cause unwarranted hardship, instead of striking down such provisions, it
Naga People's Movement, at T 54.
Naga People's Movement, at T 55.
a3Kartar Singh, at T 133; PUCL, at T 25.
134 Kartar Singh, at T 451 (Sahai, J. concurring).
a3PUCL, at T 23-27.
136 PUCL, at T 46-49.
'3
State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah, (20o8) 13 SCC 5 (Supreme Court of
India).
as Id.
12
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made recommendations to the political branches to look into the matter.
Therefore, for example, in Kartar Singh the Court recommended the
constitution of Review Committees to appraise individual cases under
T.A.D.A., as well as the overall working of the legislation.139 Similarly, it
recognized the hardship likely to be caused due to provisions for direct
appeal to the Supreme Court, particularly in terms of access to the
Court and the expenditure likely to be incurred in obtaining such access.
However, instead of invalidating the provision the Supreme Court asked
Parliament to intervene in the matter. 140
(e) Struck down provisions on ground of vagueness and
arbitrariness
The Court struck down Section 22, T.A.D.A. dealing with the usage of
photographs for basing identification;141 and the part of Section 21(5),
M.C.O.C.A., that dealt with the denial of bail under the Act if the accused
was on bail under any other Act as well. In this latter case, the Court
held that the provision denying bail to the accused on the ground that he
was on bail under another Act, did not have any nexus with the object of
M.C.O.C.A., which is to prevent organized crime. Hence to this extent, the
section was struck down.142
Taken together these cases exemplify minimalist decision-making.
The Court articulates its role in terms of balancing competing interests
of national security and civil liberties; it provides broad deference to the
legislature, not only to its policy, and its understanding of what is required
and permissible to implement the policy, but also by engaging in a fair
amount of legal gymnastics to uphold constitutionality of provisions. It
evaluates legislative provisions not for their impact on Fundamental Rights
of citizens, but to examine whether the provisions further the purpose
of the Act on the one hand, and whether there are enough procedural
safeguards to prevent misuse on the other. Where in spite of this curtailed
review, a provision does not pass muster, the Court takes over the role of
the legislative drafter and provides a procedural framework to prevent

140

Kartar Singh, at T 265.
KartarSingh,at T 297.

141

Kartar Singh, at T 361.

'3

State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah, (20o8) 13 SCC 5 (Supreme Court of
India).
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misuse, or recommends measures for the Parliament's consideration. Very
rarely, if at all, does it invalidate a provision.
In terms of examining executive action, it has to be noted that the
Court has moved from deferring to the subjective satisfaction of the official
concerned, to abrogating for itself the power to review the sufficiency
of the objective factors which lead to such action/decision. This is done
principally to ensure compliance with procedures and to prevent misuse,
and reflects changes in the jurisprudence on the scope of judicial review
of administrative actions.143 Broadly therefore, the Court has taken a
hands-off approach when faced with issues of broader legislative policy
and framework, but has sought to ensure that in individual cases, the
executive does not go beyond the bounds of the legislative mandate. This
approach to adjudication of terror-related cases exhibits both the narrow
and shallow aspects of minimalism. It is narrow in that the focus is on
procedural compliance in individual cases; and shallow because of the
reluctance to engage with the broader issue of the permissible extent
of state intrusion into civil liberties. Instead, the Court confines itself
to reviewing whether the provision is in furtherance of the legislation
concerned and has enough procedural safeguards.
One other feature of minimalist decision-making evident in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on terror cases, is that of incrementalism.
For example, in Kartar Singh the Court upheld Sections 3 and 4 of
T.A.D.A., despite there being no clear guidance on how to differentiate
between a T.A.D.A. offence and a normal I.P.C. offence made out on
the same facts. The Court merely opined that since T.A.D.A. provided
more stringent provisions, the designated court would have to be extravigilant to ensure that the ingredients of the offence were made out. 144
However, once it was brought to light in a later case that the complexity
and substantial ambiguity of the issue was leading to misuse of the Act,
the Court took up the matter in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of

For instance, the Court moved from refusing to look at subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority, but only examining orders on grounds of mala fide and excessive
delegation (See, Sadanandan), to looking at the objective materials on which the executive
authority arrived at its decision. (See, PUCL, at T 45). See also, Om Kumar v. Union of India,
(2001) 2 SCC 386 (Supreme Court of India) (discussing the move from testing administrative
action using the Wednesbury principles to doing so on the touchstone of proportionality).
144 See, Kartar Singh, T 147, quoting Ahmadi, J. (as he then was) in Niranjan Singh Karam
Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya , (1990) 4 SCC 76, T 8 (Supreme Court of India).
143
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Maharashtra.145Here, the Supreme Court was again asked to clarify the
exact scope of T.A.D.A. vis-a-vis provisions of other penal statutes. The
Court then looked into the purpose of the enactment and the express
words of the provisions to hold that for T.A.D.A. to be attracted the
accused must have had the specific intention of spreading terror and must
have undertaken the impugned activities for this motive. It held that the
intention and not the consequence of the alleged terrorist act was the true
test of deciding whether the legislation was attracted.146
Another illustration of incrementalist decision-making relates to the
issue of Review Committees. In Kartar Singh, while upholding Section
15 of T.A.D.A., on the admissibility in court of confessions made to police
officers, the Supreme Court recommended the setting up of executive
Review Committees to provide a "higher level of scrutiny"147 so as to
evaluate the imposition of T.A.D.A. in individual cases and the working of
the Act in general. This was an integral rationale for upholding what many
viewed as a draconian measure.148 This was enough to decide the core
issue before the Court in Kartar Singh, which concerned the constitutional
validity of Section 15. However, the Court did not look into the broader
issues of, what effect a Review Committee finding on the use or abuse
of T.A.D.A. should have in a matter pending before a court, or the even
broader separation of powers issue of whether an executive committee
could validly be asked to determine the innocence or guilt of a person
whose trial was underway in a court of law.
The first issue came to be decided in R. M. Tewari v . State,1 49 where
the Court held that even where the Review Committee found in a given
instance that T.A.D.A. had been wrongly applied, this finding could not
lead to the automatic withdrawal of a case pending before a T.A.D.A.
court. The public prosecutor had to first apply his mind to the opinion
of the Review Committee and only if he was in agreement with the
recommendation, could he approach the court for withdrawal of the case

Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 (Supreme Court of
India).
146 Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602, T 6, 7, 15 (Supreme
Court of India).
147 Kartar Singh, at T 265.
148 See, Kartar Singh, at T 193 and 194 (where the Court refers to Mr Ram Jethmalani's
scathing attack on the provision).
149 R.M. Tewari v. State, (1996) 2 SCC 61o (Supreme Court of India).
145
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under Section 321, CrPC. The final decision to permit withdrawal would
rest with the designated court.150
Issues relating to separation of powers and the impartiality of
executive Review Committees came up before the Supreme Court on a
few occasions. In Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India,151 the Court

itself raised questions over the impartiality of Review Committees as then
constituted, and recommended that such committees be headed by retired
Judges.152 However, the Court did not re-open the issue of the validity of
the stringent provisions of T.A.D.A. even though it found that on the one
hand there was large scale abuse of T.A.D.A. provisions and on the other,
Review Committees, which were meant to be essential safeguards, were
not working impartially in all cases. 153
The issue of the working of Review Committees, particularly the
separation of powers concerns over the validity of executive review
of pending court cases, as well as the exact impact of the Review
Committee decision on a court case, came to be considered in the case
of Mahamadhusen Sheikh v. Union of India.154 This case came up in
the context of the Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Act of 2004, which
provided for executive review of P.O.T.A. cases, and automatic withdrawal
of cases pending before courts where the Review Committee found
that no prima facie case had been made out. Here the Court recognized
that while ordinarily executive bodies cannot review court cases, in the
instant case, since P.O.T.A. had already been repealed and the impugned
provision was more in the nature of winding up of the Act, the intention
was not to encroach upon the judicial sphere.155 Further, it was held that a
Review Committee decision in favour of the accused would have automatic
effect and would not be governed by Section 321, Cr.P.C. in light of clear
legislative mandate.15 6
This case brought the issue of Review Committees to a full circle. The
Court began its journey by upholding the constitutionality of stringent
R.M. Tewari v. State, (1996) 2 SCC 61o (Supreme Court of India), at T 1o.
Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 (Supreme Court of India)
[Hereinafter 'Shaheen'].
152 Shaheen, at T 5.
153 Shaheen, at T 5.
154 Mahmadhusen Abdulrahim Kalota Shaikh v. Union of India, (2009) 2 SCC 1 (Supreme
Court of India) [Hereinafter 'Kalota Shaikh'].
56 Id.
156Kalota Shaikh.
1o

151
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T.A.D.A. provisions by creating additional safeguards in the form of
"higher levels of scrutiny" by Review Committees; then decided that this
"higher level of scrutiny" would not automatically impact a pending court
case; then found through the mechanism of the Review Committees that
there was large scale abuse of T.A.D.A., as also that Review Committees
themselves were not always working impartially, but did not re-open the
issue of constitutionality of the initial T.A.D.A. provisions; and concluded
by examining whether review by such executive committees of pending
court cases, and their power to order withdrawal of cases was itself
constitutional, or an unjustified encroachment into the judicial sphere.
It is also interesting to note that in Shaheen Welfare Assn., the Court
was made cognizant of the vast number of long-pending T.A.D.A. cases
and the high number of detenus under the Act. While the Court recognized
that T.A.D.A. was being misused, that the additional safeguard of Review
Committees was not always impartial, and that the delay in adjudication
of such cases was violating the Fundamental Right of the detenus under
Article 21, in a classic minimalist move, the court made a one-off, factbound decision, to divide the pending cases into various categories
according to the seriousness of offences, and provided guidelines on
whether and how to grant bail to persons under various categories.57

Declaring this to be a "pragmatic" approach,158 the Court held that this
was required to reconcile the conflicting claims of individual liberty and
the right of the community and the nation to safety and protection from
terrorism and disruptive activities.159
Our attempt in this section has been to highlight the institutional
self-understanding of the Supreme Court of its role, approach and
methodology in dealing with national security and terror-related cases. We
have not made a normative claim about the validity or otherwise of this
understanding. However, in the following segment, we will critique it with
reference to the Court's understanding of its role, approach and methods
in general constitutional adjudication.

'5 Shaheen, at T 12-16.
is

Shaheen, at T 11 and

159

Shaheen, at T 9 and

12.
12.
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IV. CONFUSION REIGNS SUPREME
In this segment we will argue that the Court's adoption of minimalist
approaches to decision-making in terror-related cases is not a thought out
or conscious decision-making strategy but an opportunistic role reversal,
smacking of judicial escapism. This is because as a matter of general
policy, Indian courts have not been minimalist; rather the opposite. We
show by example that down the years the Court has shunned minimalist
approaches for what Sunstein terms "liberty maximalism",160 and that the
Court has not justified why an exception should be carved out in the case
of terror-adjudication.
A. Role Confusion
In the previous section we highlighted the Court's minimalist
understanding of its role, in terms of mediating between the competing
claims of national security and civil liberties. However, in non-terror cases,
the Court has conceived of its role more broadly. It sees its role as that of
the guardian of constitutional values,161 and its duty as that of protecting
Fundamental Rights.

6

2

As far back as

1952,

the Court ruled that the

Constitution has assigned it the role of being "a sentinel on the qui vive",
with respect to Fundamental Rights. 63 Hence, while it respected legislative
judgment, it could not "desert its own duty to determine finally the
Constitutionality of an impugned statute".64 Emphasizing that individual
rights are superior to other social concerns, 65 the Court has held that
its duty is to "zealously and vigilantly" 66 and in an "activist manner"67
protect the civil rights and liberties of citizens against legislative and
executive action. 6 8 Therefore in general Fundamental Rights adjudication,
the Court sees a "liberty maximizing" role for itself.
o Sunstein, Minimalism at War, at 3.

61 P.N.

Dua v. P. Shiv Shanker, (1988) 3 SCC 167, T 36 (Supreme Court of India); C.K.

Dapthary v. O.P. Gupta, (1971) 1 SCC 626, T 52 (Supreme Court of India); Ujjam Bai v. State
of U.P., AIR 1962 SC 1621: (1963) 1 SCR 778, T 309 (Supreme Court of India).
162I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N., (2007) 2 SCC 1, T 130 (Supreme Court of India).

163State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196 (Supreme Court of India).
164 Id, at T
14.
16 See, Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2oo8) 6 SCC 1, T 278 (Supreme Court of
India). See also, Anuj Garg v. Hotel Assn. of India, (20o8) 3 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India).
66 Raja Ram Pal v. Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184, T 651 (Thakker, J. concurring) (Supreme
Court of India).
of A.P. v. Laxmi Devi, (2008) 4 SCC 720, T 88 (Supreme Court of India).

167Govt.
68 Id.

NLSIR | SPECIAL ISSUE | 2013

133

The maximalist role that the Court sees for itself can be gauged from
the manner in which it has approached constitutional adjudication as
well. For example, in Kesavananda Bharativ. State of Kerala,19 the Court
was called upon to decide on whether Golak Nath v. State of Punjab,170
was rightly decided. However, instead of limiting itself to that narrow
question, the Court took the opportunity of examining the power of the
Parliament to amend the Constitution.171 In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of

India,172 the Court was called upon to decide whether Section lo(3)(c),
Passport Act contravened Articles 14, 19 and 21.173 It could have decided
169Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4

SCC 225 (Supreme Court of India).
[Hereinafter 'Kesavananda Bharati']
170 I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643 (Supreme Court of India).
171See, Kesavananda Bharati, at T 1o, where Sikri, C.J. says:
...However, as I see it, the question whether Golak Nath's case was rightly decided
or not does not matter, because the real issue is different and of much greater
importance, the issue being: what is the extent of the amending power conferred by
Article 368 of the Constitution, apart from Article 13(2), on Parliament?
See, KesavanandaBharati, at T 510, where Shelat and Grover, JJ. say:

The decision in Golak Nath has become academic, for even on the assumption that
the majority decision in that case was not correct, the result on the questions now
raised before us, in our opinion, would just be the same. The issues that have been
raised travel far beyond that decision and the main question to be determined now is
the scope, ambit and extent of the amending power conferred by Article 368. On that
will depend largely the decision of the other matters arising out of the 25th and the
29th amendments.
See also, Kesavananda Bharati, at T 790, where Ray, J. says:
The real question is whether there is any power to amend the Constitution and if
so whether there is any limitation on the power. The answer to this question depends
on these considerations. First, what is the correct ratio and effect of the decision
in LC. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab Second, should that ratio be upheld? Third, is
there any limitation on the power to amend the Constitution? Fourth, was the 24th
Amendment validly enacted? If it was, is there any inherent and implied limitation on
that power under Article 368 as amended?
12 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 (Supreme Court of India).
173Id, at T T 49 and 50, where Bhagwati, J. says:
The Petitioner thereupon filed the present petition challenging the action of the
Government in impounding her passport and declining to give reasons for doing
so...The principal challenge set out in the petition against the legality of the action
of the Government was based mainly on the ground that Section io( 3 )(c), in so far
as it empowers the Passport Authority to impound a passport "in the interests of
the general public" is violative of the equality clause contained in Article 14 of the
Constitution, since the condition denoted by the words "in the interests of the general
public" limiting the exercise of the power is vague and undefined and the power
conferred by this provision is, therefore, excessive and suffers from the vice of "overbreath."The petition also contained a challenge that an order under Section 1o(3)(c)
impounding a passport could not be made by the Passport Authority without giving
an opportunity to the holder of the passport to be heard in defence and since in the
present case, the passport was impounded by the Government without affording an
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, the order was null and void, and, in the
alternative, if Section 1o(3)(c) were read in such a manner as to exclude the right of
hearing, the section would be infected with the vice of arbitrariness and it would be
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the case on statutory and procedural grounds, instead of reading in a due
process requirement into Article 21, and linking Articles 14, 19 and 21; in
Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin,174 the Court could have confined
itself to reading down Section 51, Code of Civil Procedure, instead of
examining it on the anvil of Fundamental Rights and human dignity.175 In
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India,76 the Supreme Court decided to rule on an
academic question and established a major principle of accountability for
executive action, which it need not have gone into at all.77 In Bodhisattwa

void as offending Article 14. These were the only grounds taken in the Petition as
originally filed...The petitioner filed an application for urging additional grounds and
by this application, two further grounds were sought to be urged by her. One ground
was that Section lo(3)(c) is ultra vires Article 21 since it provides for impounding of
passport without any procedure as required by that Article, or, in any event, even
if it could be said that there is some procedure prescribed under the Passport Act,
1967, it is wholly arbitrary and unreasonable and, therefore, not in compliance with
the requirement of that article. The other ground urged on behalf of the petitioner
was that Section 1o(3)(c) is violative of Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) inasmuch as it

authorises imposition of restrictions on freedom of speech and expression guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(a) and freedom to practise any profession or to carry on any
occupation, or business guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) and these restrictions are
impermissible under Article 19(2) and Article 19(6) respectively.
174 Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin, (1980) 2 SCC 360 (Supreme Court of India).
175 Id at T 2-5 and 18, where the Court says:
From the perspective of international law the question posed is whether it is
right to enforce a contractual liability by imprisoning a debtor in the teeth of Article
11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights...An apercu of Article
21 of the Constitution suggests the question whether it is fair procedure to deprive a
person of his personal liberty merely because he has not discharged his contractual
liability in the face of the constitutional protection of life and liberty as expounded
and expanded by a chain of rulings of this Court...A third, though humdrum,
question is as to whether, in this case, Section 51 has been complied with in its
enlightened signification. This turns on the humane meaning of the provision.. .we
must candidly state that the Special Leave Petition is innocent of these two issues and
the arguments at the bar have avoided virgin adventures. Even so, the points have
been raised and counsel have helped with their submissions. We therefore, proceed
to decide.. .The question may squarely arise some day as to whether the Proviso to
Section 51 read with Order 21, Rule 37 is in excess of the Constitutional mandate in
Article 21 and bad in part. In the present case since we are remitting the matter for
reconsideration, the stage has not yet arisen for us to go into the vires, which is why
we are desisting from that essay.
176S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India).
177Ramaswamy, J. says:
Though the need to decide these questions practically became academic due
to conducting elections to the State Assemblies and the new Legislative Assemblies
were constituted in the States of U.P. , Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal
Pradesh, all the counsel requested us to decide the questions regardless of the relief
to be granted in this case. As stated earlier, since the decision on these questions is of
paramount importance for successful working of the Constitution, we acceded to their
prayer.
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1, T 154 (Supreme Court of India).
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8 when called upon to decide whether the
Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty,7
High Court was right in not quashing the complaint filed by the victim, the
Court ruled that rape was a violation of the right to life and established
the principle that a victim of rape can be awarded interim compensation
during the pendency of the trial.

In terror related cases however, the Court tries to tread a fine line
between upholding Fundamental Rights and protecting national security.
As highlighted in the previous section, it does so by engaging in statutory
interpretation and checking for procedural compliance, rather than
expounding upon constitutional principles. Thus, it is evident that the
Court perceives a different role for itself in general Fundamental Rights
adjudication as opposed to the adjudication of Fundamental Rights
claims in terror-related cases. This difference in role however has neither
been explained nor justified by the Court and in the absence of such
justification; this role reversal appears more ad-hoc than deliberate.
It is true that the rights guaranteed by Part III are not all absolute,
and that Articles 19 and 21 in particular have inbuilt limitations, which
makes it inevitable that the Court will have to decide on the scope of
the right vis-A-vis its limitations. However, it has to be understood that
these limitations are both permissive and restrictive: permissive because
they allow the State to limit the rights and freedoms guaranteed by these
Articles, and restrictive because they prescribe the limits and extent to
which, and the purposes wherefore, these limitations might be placed.179
In general Fundamental Rights adjudication, the Court has therefore taken
the view that the right or the freedom enunciates the broad principle, and
the limitations are in the nature of exceptions. The Court's approach has
been to uphold the right unless the State can show that the restriction
placed thereon is reasonable, and in the case of Article 19 rights, for a
purpose mentioned in the limitation clauses.8 o Therefore, though the
Court has been called upon to balance rights against limitations thereon,
it has adopted a weighted balancing approach; where the scales are
weighted in favour of upholding the right, and where a heavy burden is
placed on the State to justify, on grounds of both reasonableness as well
17sBodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty, (1996) 1 SCC 490 : AIR 1996 SC 922
(Supreme Court of India).
179 M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1147
(2003).
iso See, Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 531 : AIR 1980 SC 1983, T 3
(Supreme Court of India) ("The courts should always lean in favour of upholding personal
liberty, for it is one of the most cherished values of mankind").
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as purpose of the restriction, why the scales should be tipped in their
favour.181 However, in terror-related constitutional adjudication, we contend
that the Court has flipped this approach, weighting the scales in favour of
the limitation, and seeking to uphold the limitation rather than the right.
As we will argue in the next two segments in this part, the Court does this
by adopting an excessively deferential approach to the legislature; and by
subjecting anti-terror legislations to limited scrutiny, restricting itself to
examining the nexus of specific provisions with the broad purpose of the
Act, and the presence of procedural safeguards.
B. Ambiguities in Approach
It has been seen above that the Court has adopted a highly deferential
approach towards the legislature in dealing with terror-related issues.
It has refused to examine legislative policy,18 2 and has deferred to the
legislature's understanding of the types of actions required to meet
the ends of this policy.18 3 However, in general Fundamental Rights
adjudication, the Court has time and again clarified that where the law
encroaches upon civil liberties, it will not grant deference to the political
branches, but will "carefully scrutinize whether the legislation on these
subjects is violative of the rights and liberties of the citizens, and its
approach must be to uphold those rights and liberties,for which it may
84
sometimes even have to declare a statute to be unconstitutional".1
This difference in approach is epitomized by some of the most famous
and enduring judgments of the Court. Keshvanand Bharati and Maneka
Gandhi are but two examples of the refusal of the Court to defer to
legislative will, and of the testing of legislative and executive action against
constitutional principles, be it those enshrined in the basic constitutional
structure, or the golden thread of justness, fairness and reasonableness
that runs through Part III of the Indian Constitution. This difference in
the deference approach is also evident in the Court's review of "political
questions", which were once thought to be beyond the pale of judicial

isi See, Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386, T 30 (Supreme Court of India) ("The
burden of proof to show that the restriction was reasonable lay on the State"); Deena alias
Deen Dayal v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1155 (Supreme Court of India); Saghir Ahmed v.
State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 728, T 27 (Supreme Court of India).
1s2 PUCL, at T 22.
is3 Kartar Singh, at T 145.
14

Govt. of A.P. v. Laxmi Devi, (2008) 4 SCC 720, T 78 (Supreme Court of India).
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review.8 5 In this respect, Justice Shah's observation in the Privy Purse
case that the "[c]onstitutional mechanism in a democratic polity does
not contemplate existence of any function which may qua the citizens be
designated as political and orders made in exercise whereof are not liable
to be tested for their validity before the lawfully constituted courts"18 6
reflects the approach of the Court in undertaking a Fundamental Rights
review in general rights adjudication.
For purposes of protecting Fundamental Rights, the Court has gone
to the extent of ruling that even legislative policy must confirm to
constitutional mandates, and if it does not, courts have the power to
intervene. Therefore it has held that matters of policy are subject to
judicial review.8 7 Thus the Court's carving out of a more deferential
role in terror-related issues as opposed to general Fundamental Rights
adjudication is also starkly evident, but as emphatically unexplained.
The Court's terror-related jurisprudence has also confused legislative
policy with strategies to achieve those policies.,"" Therefore in PUCL
the Court refused to go into the need for an anti-terror legislation that
provided for a different set of procedures to deal with the menace of
terrorism on the ground that the normal procedures are inadequate
to deal with the issue.18 9 Here the policy of the legislature is to adopt
a no-tolerance approach to terror. However, the strategy to implement
this policy which is more closely aligned to the issue of the need for the
legislation, is that of whittling down general procedural rights. Whether or
not this strategy is constitutionally permissible, is clearly within the scope
of judicial review, as held by the Court itself, inter alia, in Delhi Science
isn See, S.P. Gupta v. President of India, 1981 Supp. SCC 87 : AIR 1982 SC 149 (Supreme

Court of India) (political questions are bound to assume judicial colour), A.K. Jha v. Union
of India, (2005) 3 SCC 150 (Supreme Court of India); Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v.
Bombay Environmental Action Group, (2oo6) 3 SCC 434 : AIR 2oo6 SC 1489, T 92 - 93
(Supreme Court of India).
is6 Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 85.
i17 State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata, (2005) 12 SCC 77, T 18 (Supreme Court of India). See
also, Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Bombay Environmental Action Group, (20o6) 3 SCC
434, T 88 and 89 (Supreme Court of India).
iss Justice Ruma Pal, Judicial Oversight or Overreach: The Role of the Judiciary in
Contemporary India, (2oo8) 7 SCC J-9, J-18, J-20. (But, say the critics, Judges are really
indulging in policy making, which is the sole prerogative of the other two branches of
government. Without a definition of the word 'policy' the charge lacks clarity. Does it mean
the prioritization of social or economic goals, or does it mean the method by which the
goals are to be achieved? Courts do not in fact interfere with the first but have subjected the
second to judicial scrutiny under their powers of judicial review).
is9 PUCL, at T 9 and 14.
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Forum v. Union of Indial90 and Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of
India.191

Both policy and strategy have to be tested on the touchstone of the
Constitution. In the words of the Supreme Court itself in Anuj Garg,
the legislative act has to be justified in principle, and proportionate in
measure. 19 2 Therefore in this case, while the Court agreed that the purpose
behind the impugned provision, that of providing security to women, was
within the power of the State, the strategy of doing so by restricting their
autonomy was not permissible.193 To take a hypothetical example, if the
Legislature were to decide that it will adopt a no tolerance policy against
religious conflict and violence, and for this purpose enacts a legislation
prohibiting any public practice, profession or propagation of any religion
on the ground that this right is anyway subject to public order, then merely
because the broad policy is justified, the strategy to achieve the policy
does not automatically become justified. It still has to be tested against
constitutional provisions. The simple point here is that the ends do not
justify the means. In terror-related adjudication however, the Court seems
to think otherwise.
C. Methodological Divergence
(a) Limited scrutiny

The Court's methodology in terror-related constitutional review is
as follows: It takes the legislative policy and strategy as a given which it
will not review; tests specific provisions to see if they are relatable to the
purposes for which the legislation was enacted; if this nexus exists, it
checks whether there are enough procedural safeguards to prevent misuse,
and then upholds the legislation. If it finds that there are not enough
safeguards, the Court either reads them in, or requests the Legislature to
consider the matter. In exceptional cases, where the Court feels that the
provisions are too harsh, it reads them down.194

Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 405, T 7 (Supreme Court of India).
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664, 229 (Supreme Court of
India).
192Anuj Garg v. Hotel Assn. of India, (20o8) 3 SCC 1, T T 46, 51 (Supreme Court of India)
[Hereinafter 'Anuj Garg'].
190
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Id at T 36.

194

See, § III B above.
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An example of this type of reasoning is evident in P.U.C.L., in the
context of the Court's appraisal of the provisions on bail.195 Sections 49(6)
and (7) were impugned inter alia on grounds of the long period of pretrial detention and the virtual impossibility of getting bail due to harsh
conditions. These were assailed as arbitrary. The Court however ruled
that the long period of detention was needed in light of the purposes of
the Act, and since there was judicial oversight, the provision had enough
procedural safeguards.196 On this basis the provision was held to be nonarbitrary. Similarly, in Bharat Shah, the Court held wiretapping provisions
of the MCOCA as reasonable because such actions were for purposes of the
Act; and in Naga Peoples' Movement, Section 4(a), Armed Forces (Special
Powers)Act, which empowers officers to fire upon and even kill persons
acting in contravention of certain orders was held to be not unreasonable
or arbitrary because there were enough procedural safeguards.197
In terror-related adjudication therefore, the Supreme Court tests the
reasonableness or arbitrariness of provisions based on the nexus of the
provision with the purpose of the Act, and on the basis of procedural
safeguards against misuse. Unlike, general Fundamental Rights review, a
determination of whether the restriction is "arbitraryor of an excessive
nature, beyond what is required for achieving the objects of the
8 or the test of proportionality
legislation",19
between "legitimate aims"
of the legislation and the means used to achieve it, are not used in these
cases. 199 In general Fundamental Rights review however, the Court has
consistently taken a much deeper approach to understanding the concept
of arbitrariness and reasonableness, going beyond nexus with purpose of

195PUCL, at T 65-70.
196 PUCL, at T 67 (arguing that since the offences under POTA are highly complex
and may
involve nationals as well as foreigners, investigation might require some time; hence, long
periods of detention were justified and hence not unreasonable. In spite of this the grant of
bail was not completely barred and if the court decided that the person was not guilty he
could be released on bail).
197 Naga People's Movement, at T 46.
19sOm Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386, T 30 (Supreme Court of India), referring
to the ratio in Chintamanrao v. State of U.P., AIR 1951 SC 118 : 1950 SCR 759 (Supreme
Court of India).

199Anuj

Garg, at T 51.
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the Act, 2 0 0 and has substantively assessed whether an impugned provision

is reasonable.201
The focus of the Court in terror-related adjudication is therefore on
ensuring internal consistency between the purpose of the Act and its
provisions, and on providing procedural safeguards against misuse, rather
than substantively assessing whether an impugned provision violates
Fundamental Rights. Therefore the Court does not appear to be testing
impugned provisions for Constitutional validity, but to ensure that they
are not misused, which is a different kind of enquiry - more a matter of
cautious legislative drafting rather than judicial review. They seem to be
missing the point that the proper use of a constitutionally invalid law can
still infringe Fundamental Rights.
To return to our hypothetical example above, if in furtherance of the
legislative policy of curbing religious violence, and its strategy of banning
the practice of religion in public to meet this end, the Legislature enacts a
provision criminalizing the act of publicly referring to God, the Court will
hold the provision reasonable because it furthers the legislative purpose.
The Court will only examine whether there are enough safeguards to
ensure that no one is wrongly accused of publicly referring to God, for
example, by looking at the kind of evidence required as proof. Therefore,
in terror-related rights adjudication, the Court engages in a limited
scrutiny of the impugned provisions.
The Court's discussion of the constitutionality of the bail provisions of
P.O.T.A. also indicates that its approach to reviewing provisions of terror
See generally, E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3 (Supreme Court of India);
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 (Supreme Court of India). See
also, Justice Ruma Pal, Judicial Oversight or Overreach: The Role of the Judiciary in
200

ContemporaryIndia, (2oo8) 7 SCC J-9, J-18, J-14.

See, State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75 T 95 (Supreme Court of India)
I can conceive of cases, where there is the utmost good faith and where the classification
is scientific and rational and yet which would offend this law. Let us take an imaginary cases
in which a State legislature considers that all accused persons whose skull measurements
are below a certain standard, or who cannot pass a given series of intelligence tests, shall
be tried summarily whatever the offence on the ground that the less complicated the trial
the fairer it is to their sub-standard of intelligence. Here is classification. It is scientific and
systematic. The intention and motive are good. There is no question of favouritism, and yet
I can hardly believe that such a law would be allowed to stand. But what would be the true
basis of the decision? Surely, simply this that the judges would not consider that fair and
proper. However much the real ground of decision may be hidden behind a screen of words
like 'reasonable', 'substantial', 'rational' and 'arbitrary' the fact would remain that Judges are
substituting their own judgment of what is right and proper and reasonable and just for that
of the legislature; and up to a point that, I think, is inevitable when a Judge is called upon to
crystallise a vague generality like Article 14 into a concrete concept.
2o1
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enactments is that, if the provision is needed, it is reasonable. Taking such
an interpretation would mean that the need for a particular State action
decides the scope of a Fundamental Right, rather than Fundamental
Rights placing limits on state action.202 This view is exactly similar to the
Gopalan doctrine that the legislative wisdom on the justness of a provision
decides the scope of the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed to a
person.
(b) Necessity Review v. Reasonableness Review
In P.U.C.L., Section 18, POTA, which provided that the Central
Government can declare any organization a terrorist organization, without
having the obligation of giving them the right to be heard before making
such a declaration, was challenged inter alia on the ground that it violated
the right to freedom of association under Article 19(1)(c). This provision
was upheld on the ground that the right to association under Article 19(1)
(c) could be limited in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of the
country, and that since this was the purpose of the provision, the section
was not unconstitutional. Similarly a challenge to the constitutionality
of Section 14, POTA on the ground that it violated the right to privacy
was disallowed because in the opinion of the Court "right to privacy...is
not an absolute right. Right to privacy is subservient to that of security
of State",203 and since the purpose of the section was relatable to state
security, the provision was valid. In both these, and other instances,
the Court held the provision to be reasonable because it was for a valid
purpose.
The concept of reasonableness in Part III of the Constitution flows
from Article 19.204 This Article provides a list of enumerated rights
It is interesting to note that in P.U.C.L., the Court was itself of the view that the "fight
against terrorism has to be circumscribed by human rights". However, in its adjudication
methodology, it seems to have lost sight of this principle. On the nature of Fundamental
Rights, see M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (20o6) 8 SCC 212, T 17 (Supreme Court of India)
It is a fallacy to regard Fundamental Rights as a gift from the State to its citizens.
Individuals possess basic human rights independently of any Constitution by reason of basic
fact that they are members of the human race. These Fundamental Rights are important
as they possess intrinsic value. Part III of the Constitution does not confer Fundamental
Rights. It confirms their existence and gives them protection. Its purpose is to withdraw
certain subjects from the area of political controversy to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts
... Fundamental right is a limitation on the power of the State.
202

203
204

PUCL, at T 37.

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 (Supreme Court of India).
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and the permissible limitations thereon. The limitation clauses allow
"reasonable restrictions" for certain enumerated purposes. Therefore,
the Article provides a two step scrutiny: whether the restriction is for a
purpose mentioned in the limitation clause, and whether the restriction is

reasonable.205
However, as the examples above illustrate, in terror-related adjudication,
where the Court finds that the purpose of a provision is relatable to a
constitutionally mandated ground for limitation, this is sufficient to uphold
the provision. The Court seems to be missing the point that not everything
done in furtherance of a valid purpose is necessarily constitutionally
valid, for the simple reason that ends do not necessarily justify the means.
It also seems to be confusing necessity for reasonableness. As the Court
has itself recognized in Krishna Chandra v. State of M.P., 06 when asked
to rule on the constitutionality of a statute, the core issue for the Court
to determine is whether the law enacted to achieve a certain objective
imposes unreasonablerestrictions on guaranteed rights.207 The Court also
seems to be going back on the principle enunciated in a line of cases like
State of WB. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar,208 and Bennett Coleman v. Union of
India209 that it is the consequence of the Act, and not its purpose, that is
determinative of whether it infringes a FundamentalRight.
2

V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in terror-related adjudication,
and in cases involving national security concerns more broadly, shows
a consistent narrow conceptualization of its role, an approach of broad
deference to the legislature, and a methodology of undertaking a limited
scrutiny of provisions in testing them against Fundamental Rights. The
Court prefers decision-making on statutory rather than constitutional
grounds; and focuses on procedural compliance rather than substantive
review. It is concerned with ensuring that there are adequate procedural
safeguards to prevent misuse of provisions, and is open to examining
individual instances of executive action under terror-related legislation to
20
206

207
20s
209

See generally, M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1147 (2003).
Krishna Chandra v. State of M.P., AIR 1965 SC 307 (Supreme Court of India).
Id, at T 14.
State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75, T 48 (Supreme Court of India).

Bennett Coleman v. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 788 : AIR 1973 SC 1o6 (Supreme Court

of India).
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check for compliance with legislative and constitutional principles, rather
than striking down the legislative principles themselves. Taken together,
there is remarkable consistency in this approach, not only with the theory
of minimalism, but also in terms of uniformity in decision-making.
From A.K. Gopalan, decided in 1950, through A.D.M., Jabalpur,decided

during the midst of the Emergency, to Bharat Shah, decided in late 2008,
the Court's approach to terror/national security related constitutional
adjudication remains constant.
This minimalist conception of the Court's role, and its corresponding
approach and method of adjudication are however at odds with the general
adjudicatory practices of the Court with respect to Fundamental Rights
review. We have argued that in general Fundamental Rights adjudication,
the Court conceives its role more broadly, takes a less deferential approach
to adjudication and adopts a deeper review of restrictions on Fundamental
Rights. In this article, we have not argued that one is better than the
other. We have merely sought to describe the difference and point out
that this dichotomy in approach has neither been explained nor justified
either with respect to the normative bases of minimalism or in relation
to other policy concerns. In the absence of such justification, and in
light of different approaches adopted by judiciaries of other countries,
most notably the U.K., 2 10 the Indian Supreme Court's minimalism in
terror-related adjudication appears more like diffidence, abdication and
opportunistic escapism rather than a well-deliberated and jurisprudentially
sound understanding of its place in the Indian polity.

See generally, Lord Phillips, Impact of Terrorism on the Rule of Law, available at http:/
/www.judiciary.gov.uk/ docs/speeches/lcj-american-bar-assoc o3loo7.pdf.
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